Biological weapons are not new: the threat of biological warfare has confronted humanity for centuries. In the Middle Ages, Mongol armies hurled diseased corpses over the walls of besieged cities to spread bubonic plague. In the past century, imperial Japan, the Soviet Union, Saddam Hussein's Iraq and others have developed bioweapons.
We now face a new threat in the shape of bioterrorism. A week after the hijacked airplane attacks in the US on 11?September 2001, letters containing anthrax spores were sent to two senators and several media organisations in the country. Five people died, and the attack showed how psychologically and economically damaging an attack of this kind can be: the US estimated the overall cost to be around $1?billion. The consequences of future biological attacks could be even worse, from the global release of infectious diseases to effects on public health, business and international travel.
Last week I attended the opening of the seventh review conference of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) in Geneva, Switzerland. The convention bans states from acquiring or using biological weapons. It is a cornerstone of the international arms control regime and was the first treaty to ban an entire category of weapons. The UK made the original proposal for a ban in 1968 and has been at the forefront of efforts to make the convention as effective as possible.
As well as addressing threats, the convention also considers the benefits of scientific advancement. Recent developments in medicine, agriculture and industry have had huge benefits across the globe. Left unchecked and unregulated, though, they could cross the line from beneficial application to use as weapons ? the "dual-use" problem.
Synthetic biology is a good example of this duality. On the one hand, it has led to the synthesis in Escherichia coli and yeast of a precursor of the drug artemisinin, a key tool in the fight against malaria. On the other, synthetic biology could also be exploited for harmful purposes, including the creation of new biological warfare agents.
To do
If the BTWC is to continue to be a valuable tool, it is important both that policy-makers understand the potential of new advances in science and that scientists understand their responsibilities under the convention to avoid misuse or loss of control of potentially dangerous technologies.
It is for this reason that the review conference of the BTWC is so important. Since the previous five-yearly review conference in 2006, parties to the convention have been discussing and promoting biosafety and biosecurity, promoting oversight of dual-use biological research and working on raising awareness among scientists and students. However, if the BTWC is to be genuinely effective, this month's conference has to go further. I was therefore delighted to be able to present Esther Ng of Singapore ? studying at the University of Oxford ? with a prize recognising her insightful essay on "Biosecurity ? the role of young scientists".
More comprehensive efforts are needed to address the apparent widespread lack of awareness among life scientists of biosecurity and of their responsibilities under the convention. The convention also needs to reach out to a new generation of scientists with increasingly global links.
At the conference, which runs until 22 December, the UK is proposing the formation of a group to review and respond to scientific and technological advances. The group would bring together scientists, diplomats and international organisations to discuss the implications of rapidly developing fields such as synthetic biology and nanotechnology.
There is much common ground amongst delegations from all over the world on many of the key issues facing the convention. There is an opportunity for agreement on a more frequent review of scientific and technological issues affecting it, and for better integrating scientific communities within that process. Many scientists are keen to be involved and have much to contribute. I hope the parties to the convention are bold and seize that opportunity.
Alistair Burt is parliamentary under-secretary of state at the British Foreign & Commonwealth Office. He is the member of Parliament for North East Bedfordshire
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